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Abstract 
The article explores the potency of new materialist thought and its implications for 
qualitative, or ‘post-qualitative’ methodology, but also wonders how far methodology 
has really put itself at risk. Taking its cue from a remark by Deleuze, it asks: in trying 
to free thought from the hierarchies of representation, and restore ontologies of 
difference, are we merely trying to revivify conventional method with a safe dose of 
impure Dionysian blood? Are we just acting the drunkard and whistling a Dionysian 
tune?  
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Qualitative methodology and the new materialisms: ‘a little of Dionysus’s 
blood’? 
 
Introduction 
I want to work through some issues that have been exercising me recently, around the 
turn, or return, to materiality in qualitative methodology. The new materialisms 
challenge the prerogative of the supposedly self-contained, coherent human subject, 
equipped to subdue the world with an armory of discursive and intellectual weapons – 
rationality, consciousness, creativity, intentionality, and language. A new materialist 
orientation would not suggest that these are fictions and should be abandoned, but 
rather, that they have traditionally been elevated to a status that occludes other 
capacities and connections, and diminishes the significance of matter and our human 
entanglements with it. New materialist thought challenges the notion of the world as 
the stage or background for the Big Human Adventure, and traces the many dire 
consequences of our chronic disregard for the agential and affective potential of 
matter. Not least of these consequences is the threat of human extinction. I will argue 
that the turn to materiality has powerful, but also powerfully dangerous, implications 
for qualitative research. And that these implications are not always fully recognised 
by those of us who have embraced, and been embraced by, the new materialisms.  
 
What does method want?  
It wants what Western philosophy, according to Deleuze has always wanted: in short, 
to subdue difference. To confine its antics within the iron ‘fetters’ of representation 
(1994: 174), where identity and sameness regulate affairs, and difference emerges 
chastened and stripped of potential, as mere contradiction or opposition. That desire 
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to control difference is easily seen in conventional qualitative method, with all its 
devices for reducing uncertainty and mining meaning from the ongoing flow of 
events. You can see it for instance in the sorting and subordinating practices of 
coding; or in strategies for controlling bias in interviews. You can see it in anxiety 
about data that block the route to propositional meaning: for example when jokes, 
reticence or inconsistency surface in interview transcripts. Above all you can see it in 
the deep methodic aversion to materiality and the body when these irrupt into the 
linguistic economy of research: to tears and sneers and shifting in one’s seat; to the 
currents of affect that might become fear, or disgust, or spite, or secret satisfaction, 
and disturb the equanimity of meaning.    
 
However Deleuze also argues that representation senses the presence of something 
else, something that it will always have failed to capture. Representation has a 
presentiment of the ‘chaos of potentials’, as Deleuze calls it, on which its ordered 
hierarchies stand (Stivale, 2008: 20). This is the swarming groundlessness of 
difference-in-itself, which always escapes the iron fetters of reason, precisely by 
being beyond thought. Yet representation sometimes wants to incorporate or consume 
that too. It wants to seize the powers of ‘giddiness, intoxication and cruelty’ (Deleuze, 
262) that belong to difference, and render them fit for thought and reason.  
   
But when representation becomes ‘orgiastic’ as Deleuze calls it – when it tries to 
devour the excesses of difference rather than merely control them – it nevertheless 
wants to do that without getting its fingers burnt, or its self-assurance shredded. It’s a 
question ‘of causing a little of Dionysus’s blood to flow in the organic veins of 
Apollo’ (262). Taking his lead from Nietzsche, Deleuze often associates difference 
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with Dionysus, god of excess, intoxication, giddiness and cruelty; of madness, masks 
and theatricality, and contrasts him to Apollo, god of light, clarity and good sense. 
But Deleuze notes that, so long as the iron rule of representation still covertly governs 
these adventures, we will continue to inhabit a world in which ‘one is only apparently 
intoxicated, in which reason acts the drunkard and sings a Dionysian tune while 
nonetheless remaining “pure’ reason”’ (1994: 264; emphasis added). 
 
Is this what qualitative method after the material turn wants? In trying to free thought 
from the hierarchies of representation, and restore ontologies of difference, are we 
trying to get a little of that murky, impure Dionysian blood into the ‘clear and 
distinct’ veins of Apollonian representation?  And if so, is this a matter of improper 
appropriation of materialist notions for old-school qualitative method – just acting the 
drunkard and whistling a Dionysian tune? Or should we think perhaps about judicious 
dosage – just enough Dionysian anomie to infuse life into a method that is 
increasingly exhausted, without killing the endeavour outright? I will not have a 
definitive answer to these questions. But I hope to be able to formulate some useful 
questions. 
 
What, then is new materialism, and what is it doing to qualitative research? New 
materialism is not necessarily the best term, though it is one of the most frequently 
used. I could refer instead to the new empiricisms. Or I could talk about turns: the 
material turn. The ontological turn. The posthuman turn. The speculative turn. The 
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affective turn. It would be absurd to say that we are talking about a unified 
philosophical or methodological field here.1  
 
It should also be noted that new materialism has come in for critique from scholars 
who object to the colonial arrogance of announcing oneself as ‘new’ without due 
respect to other traditions, such as feminist theorisations of the body, and indigenous 
ontologies. As Alison Jones and Te Kawehau Hoskins (2016: 79) have recently 
remarked, ‘Indigenous ontologies never had a nature-culture dualism, never truly 
differentiated nature and culture’. These are important issues and they deserve further 
attention, though I touch on them only in passing here. 
 
For the moment, it may be useful to think of the term ‘new materialisms’ as a 
‘catachresis’ – a perpetually mis-used term, or a term without a stable referent. But 
nevertheless, a signal of something afoot: something that is zigzagging across these 
diverse fields or planes, pulling them together and apart in interesting ways. Let me 
brutally summarise some characteristics of new materialist work that I hope are 
relatively uncontroversial, before going on to consider the implications specifically 
for qualitative inquiry. 
 
The material turn involves much more than a return to mundane empiricism. In the 
new materialisms, matter is agential, affective and self-differing. As Barad (2012: 59) 
																																																								1	A	range	of	new materialist work can be found in edited collection including 
Dolphijn and Van der Tuin (2012), Alaimo and Hekman (2008), Gregg and Seigworth 
(2010), Barrett and Bolt (2012), and Coole and Frost (2010). 	
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famously wrote, ‘Matter feels, converses, suffers, desires, yearns and remembers’. 
Agency and consciousness are not the prerogative of human subjects, and the 
bounded organism is not the unit of study. We are all produced from intensities and 
flows that far exceed and fall short of the contours of our bodies. Discourse does not 
discipline matter but tangles with it in shifting assemblages. Science and the social do 
not stand separate and opposed, and methodological virtue does not reside 
uncomplicatedly with one ‘side’ or the other. Lastly, experimentation is privileged 
over critique, at least where critique is construed as the exposure of error, the 
revelation of hidden circuits of power/knowledge, or the unmasking of ideology 
recent edited collection. Taken together, these characteristics raise an urgent question: 
does qualitative inquiry, as the transformative work of interpretive, intentional, 
critical human agents, still have a place in our theories and research practices? And if 
not, what shall we do? 
 
Some possible answers: we would need to stop thinking of data as raw material for 
our own intellection. We would need to rethink our practices of interpretation and 
explanation, if these involve identifying ‘what is really going on’, what something 
‘really means’, or uncovering something more significant (for example, more 
abstract; more general, more meaningful) beneath or above the surface messiness of 
talk or action. These customary understandings all assume a masterful human subject 
separate from the objects of her inquiry, which await her interventions in order to 
attain meaning. Analysis would become ‘diffractive’ – no longer a matter of 
magisterial interrogation by a human agent of her data, but an entanglement. We 
would need to develop forms of immanent critique – a matter of sensing and tweaking 
events as they unfold. We would need to think of thought as not intrinsically ‘ours’, 
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but as an impersonal force that exceeds us and catches us up. We would need to think 
of emotions, in a similar way, not as welling up from inside us, but as affect - pre-
individual intensities that connect and disconnect bodies (see further, MacLure, 
2015).  
 
It is clear therefore that we are not talking about merely tinkering with the customary 
arrangements of qualitative inquiry. We are obliged to rethink the whole ontological 
and epistemological edifice, and this means thinking outside of the remit of thought 
itself. More than 20 years ago, Deborah Britzman (1995) spoke of the need for 
educational research to become unintelligible to itself, in order to free itself of its bad 
faith and its bad habits. This remains to be done. I want to explore further the question 
of how new materialist thought challenges qualitative inquiry, by considering two 
particular areas: firstly, the status of data in qualitative research; and secondly, the 
status of language. 
 
Data 
Taking data first: the status of qualitative data within the new materialisms has 
already received critical attention, including a recent special issue of Cultural 
Studies<=>Critical Methodologies (2013; eds Koro-Ljungberg & MacLure), and a 
new chapter on data in the forthcoming 5th edition of the Sage Handbook of 
Qualitative Research (Koro-Ljungberg, MacLure & Ulmer, forthcoming). 
In conventional qualitative method, data are typically assumed to be mute until 
awakened to meaning by the interpretive prowess of the researcher and her specialist 
analytic tools. Their role is basically to nod in agreement with researchers’ 
interpretations and thereafter to disappear – lifted up or subsumed under concepts or 
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categories. But as St. Pierre (1997) reminded us years ago, data always has the 
potential to transgress the boundaries of coding and representation, and disrupt the 
whole research enterprise. Indeed, that is what qualitative method is for: to control 
those unruly potentials. New materialist research instead dwells with data’s bad 
behaviour – the ways in which it thwarts method’s desire to tame it or make it 
disappear; its capacity to force thought; its queer agency.  
 
This involves a loss of ontological security for the analyst, who can no longer exercise 
dominion over the data from the place of safety reserved for the intact, centred, 
humanist subject. Instead, researchers, participants, data, theory, things and values are 
mutually constituted in each ‘agential cut’ into, and out of the indeterminacy of 
matter, to use Barad’s (2007: 178) terminology.  
 
The task, then, is to be attentive to data’s invitation; and alert to its capacity to force 
thought. The unruly potentials in data can be sensed, for instance, on occasions when 
something seems to reach out from the inert corpus of the data to grasp us – this could 
be a comment in an interview, a fragment from a fieldnote, an anecdote, an object, a 
strange facial expression, or a feeling of deja vu. Moments like these confound the 
industrious search for meaning, and instead exert a kind of fascination. I have called 
this intensity that emanates from data a ‘glow’ (MacLure, 2013a).  
 
It can be a long-lasting glow: Rachel Holmes (2016) describes how she has endlessly 
returned to a piece of video data that has continually clawed at her, and called her 
back to new thought. It is a short clip of a playground game of ‘kiss chase’, in which 
two boys seize a young girl, who struggles to free herself. Such data, as Rachel points 
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out, are easily available, in conventional critical terms, for multiple ‘interpretations’, 
within discursive frames such as gender, play, creativity or desire. But the data always 
exceed these frames, without dismissing them or rendering them irrelevant. Homes 
(2016) writes: ‘This film continues to de-compose my past, present and future 
encounters with this playground event. It attempts to multiply worlds, imbricating 
language, the human and the material on the surface, interfering with my educational 
gaze’.  
 
This is characteristic of data in the material turn – its capacity to reach and lead 
beyond itself, to a multiplicity of things and ideas not-yet-named; but without losing 
the singularity of the data itself.  Holmes calls this relation to data ‘curiosity’. I have 
called it, elsewhere, wonder (MacLure, 2013a) which was a synonym for curiosity for 
many centuries. We might think of wonder as an alternate concept in place of analysis 
in new materialist research. We would need to be wary however of its long, 
disreputable association with colonialism and orientalism. 
 
At any rate, we are now seeing many creative interventions around data in qualitative 
research. We see data liberated from the page and the screen, taking strange forms 
and entering into unexpected assemblages with humans, who no longer merely read it 
or analyse it, but wear it, eat it, sculpt it, stitch it, walk it, breathe it, dance it. It is here 
indeed that the Dionysian spirit is perhaps most evident in post-qualitative research - 
in the displacements and metamorphoses of data.  
 
It will be important, though, to keep asking the question, in each and every specific 
case, of whether we are caught up in a dance of difference, or just acting the drunkard 
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and whistling the Dionysian tune. As long as we remain intelligible to ourselves as the 
orchestrators of data’s adventures, it will be difficult to escape the fetters of 
representation, humanism and anthropocentrism. 
 
Language 
We also need to talk about language. It is axiomatic in new materialist work that 
language has been given too much privilege in the dominant paradigms of 20th 
century thought. It has rendered material realities subordinate to the discursive 
systems that supposedly mediate them, and stolen the agency of things. In new 
materialist ontologies therefore, language is typically displaced and demoted. Rather 
than sitting at the top of the tree of reason, dispensing categories and distinctions, it is 
forced to take its place as one element of assemblages that are always both material 
and discursive (eg Barad, 2007). 
 
The demotion of language and discourse has been hugely productive, I would argue, 
in bringing about modes of critique that dissolve and remake the boundaries between 
matter and culture, science and the social. Nevertheless, I wonder if the displacement 
of language has actually gone far enough. In many accounts of material-discursive 
entanglement, the status and the mode of being of language is not itself interrogated 
(MacLure, 2013b). We are often left unclear about just how language tangles with 
matter; how words, bodies, signs, minds and discourses intra-act and entangle. And 
the materiality of language itself is often not addressed - the fact that speech is formed 
from noises, breath, grimaces and silences, and shot through with pre-linguistic pulses 
of affect, while still being animated by something immaterial that somehow 
transforms it into a passage for meaning and ideas.  
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Deleuze, in his own work, and in his collaborations with Guattari, forms one notable 
exception to this lack of attention to language. In Logic of Sense, Deleuze identifies a 
‘mad element’ in language: something that exceeds propositional meaning – a 
Dionysian spirit in language. He called it sense. Sense works as a ‘mobius strip’ – a 
double-sided surface between language and the world: it ‘happens to bodies and … 
insists in propositions’ (2004: 23, 142) allowing them to resonate and relate, and at 
the same time preventing language both from sinking back into the abject depths of 
the body or floating off as impotent ‘lofty ideas’ (150).   
 
Deleuze and Guattari (1988) looked to figures that are able to unhinge conventional 
language from the bonds of representation - the child, the madman, the poet. These 
figures are able to make language stutter  - to throw a spanner into its works by 
detaching words from their syntactic bonds and their freight of conventional meaning 
in order to play with them, and release the non-representing energies of sense. But as 
Deleuze and Guattari note, it’s all too possible to get it wrong. We may think that we 
are assembling the forces and intensities needed ‘to make thought travel, make it 
mobile, make it a force of the Cosmos’ – but end up ‘reproducing nothing but a 
scribble effacing all lines, a scramble effacing all sounds’ (1988: 344). One may, in 
other words, just be acting the Dionysian drunkard again. 
 
This is a cautionary message for those of us who are trying to respond to the 
Deleuzian call to make language stutter – to release its immanent powers of variation 
through experiments with form and meaning. We may fail to distinguish generative 
experimentation from the kind of linguistic play that was typical of some of our less 
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successful experiments with ‘postmodern’ textual practices in qualitative research. I 
would definitely include here my own past efforts. Not stuttering but scribbling.  
Many of these postmodern textual experiments failed, I would argue, to effect any 
real change in the relations of power and authority that compose and are reflected in 
research texts (c.f. MacLure, 2011), and ultimately they left the authorial self intact. 
At best (or worst) they ended up reinforcing the identity of the postmodern author as 
jester or melancholic guide to the groundless abyss beneath language and discourse. 
But Deleuzian groundlessness is not the ‘indifferent black nothingness’ envisaged by 
representation when it senses the abyss. Rather than comprising a total lack of 
differences, ‘it swarms with them’ (Deleuze, 1994: 276, 277). What would be needed 
therefore are (anti-) linguistic gambits that are genuinely capable of ‘unhinging’ 
language and apprehending the fracture that runs through the self. ‘What, after all, are 
Ideas’, Deleuze asks, rhetorically, ‘…if not these ants which enter and leave through 
the fracture in the I? (277)’ 
 
It is rare however, outside of the Deleuze-Guattarian enclave, to find new materialist 
theory that strenuously engages with the problematics of language. It is certainly the 
case that many of the leading scholars wrestle with language in the attempt to express 
new forms of relationality among human and nonhuman entities. Take for instance 
this well-known quotation from Karen Barad, which I briefly alluded to at the outset. 
But read it this time with the language specifically in mind.  
 
I have been particularly interested in how matter comes to matter. How matter 
makes itself felt... feeling, desiring and experiencing are not singular 
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characteristics or capacities of human consciousness. Matter feels, converses, 
suffers, desires, yearns and remembers (Barad, 2012: 59). 
 
This is an exhilarating statement. But it is important not to be too seduced by its 
poetics. At the least, we need to be mindful that the materialist turn over-turns 
customary relations between words and things, propositions and bodies, with 
disconcerting implications for our understanding of how meaning consorts with the 
world. It is difficult, I suggest, to read language like this outside of the conventions of 
a romanticised humanism that bestows upon matter the capacities that we so pride 
ourselves on having. Notions such as conversing, suffering and yearning would need 
to take on an altered status, or sense, in new materialist ontologies, to disable the 
implication of bequest - perhaps to a point where such words came to hover or flicker 
on the edge of intelligibility. 
 
I think the kind of language that Barad uses here reflects a certain stylistic tendency 
that is emerging within some versions of new materialist writing. Consider Jane 
Bennett’s (2010: 112) description of matter as ‘ vibrant, vital, energetic, lively, 
quivering, vibratory, evanescent and effluescent’. For me, the language of these 
passages works, again, against the attempt to displace the centred, humanist self so 
that matter may speak. There is an expansive generosity in the language of quivering, 
yearning and suffering that conjures the anthropocentric, empathetic human subject 
behind its own back.  
 
Clare Colebrook detects an ultra-humanism in theories such as these, which 
redistribute to all of nature, or life in general, the capacities for unmediated touch and 
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connection that were once the prerogative of human subjects. She argues that this 
amounts to a new image of thought, which she calls ‘hypo-hyper-hapto-neuro- 
mysticism’. She argues that this is in fact: 
 
 not a mode of thinking precisely because it operates less by way of 
statements, assumptions and values, and instead comes to a halt before a 
complex of mesmerizing images and barely thought-out figures. This 
orientation of pseudo-“thinking” is one in which a certain notion of the 
intellect as detached calculation is resented or accused in the name of a 
supposedly more primordial and proximate living ownness (2013: 1-2; 
original emphasis). 
 
This new haptic image of thought therefore sets itself against thinking, at least 
according to Colebrook’s definition of thought as ‘a comportment to the world that is 
without home, solace, identity or body (2013: 1)’ 
 
Although Colebrook does not specifically pursue the issue of language, she envisages, 
in a footnote that is currently haunting me, ‘a form of affectless philosophical critique, 
at least in theory”, and continues: ‘In addition to the world’s “murmurings” and 
“patternings” [referring to a passage by Barad] I suggest that there is another world 
that is stony, white and silent’ (2013: 10). This would indeed be a world in which 
methodology has become unintelligible to itself. At the least, it reminds me that, as 
Lyotard (1984: 81) urged many years ago, we may need to deny ourselves ‘the solace 
of good forms’.  
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Conclusion 
I started out by wondering whether new materialist methodology is genuinely 
engaging the Dionysian powers of difference, or just acting the drunkard. This is a 
complicated question, because Deleuze, in his own writing and in his collaborations 
with Guattari, has always been clear about the dangers involved in trying to harness 
the differential forces of the Cosmos. Taking his lesson from Artaud, he was aware of 
the risks of courting the mad element in language that might drag us back from the 
surface where sense plays, to the excremental depths of the schizophrenic body and 
its disarticulated language of cries and fragmented phonemes. Deleuze and Guattari 
(1998: 350) write of the risk of going too far in ‘opening the assemblage onto a 
cosmic force’, warning that we may inadvertently collapse into ‘black holes and 
closures… cosmic force gone bad’. They commend ‘an art of dosages’ or ‘injections 
of caution’ (160). 
 
It would be interesting to explore further how those dosages might be mixed, tested 
and administered. But for the moment, I think the danger is more one of failing to go 
far enough. It is difficult to think outside of the Enlightenment structures of the 
Cartesian self, and the stories it tells itself about progress, reason and the 
advancement of knowledge. So although we have come a long way in formulating 
cartographies for new materialist research, we are necessarily some way from the 
anticipated ontological transformations to our field. And this is not just because of 
institutional inertia or conservative methodology curricula in the neoliberal university. 
It is also because old epistemological habits tend to reinsert themselves behind our 
own backs. We may want to make language stutter and bring representation to its 
knees; we may believe that we are intra-acting, forming rhizomes, diffracting, 
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mapping flat ontologies and so on. And important studies are in fact emerging which 
do this – often by graduate students and early career scholars, precisely because they 
are intricately entangled with the materiality and the virtuality of the worlds they are 
researching. But I think we continue to underestimate the sheer difficulty of shedding 
the anthropocentrism that is built into our world-views and our language habits. We 
find it hard to practise critique and analysis on terms other than mastery. I know I do.  
 
Overall then, I suspect that much new materialist research is still haunted by 
representation. But this time it’s representation gone orgiastic. Or at least I would 
pose this possibility as a question – foremost of all for myself. I wonder if I am acting 
the Dionysian drunkard – mobilising all the uncanny machinery of new materialism, 
but still harnessing it to older narratives of empowerment, social justice, 
progressivism or ideology critique. To make an example of myself: I have found the 
new materialisms, and Deleuze in particular, enormously productive in helping me to 
think differently about young children and pedagogy. I have been able to see how 
bodies, matter and affect get tangled up with institutional discourses, history, policy 
and memory; and I have experienced obscure glimpses of how things could be 
otherwise. But I fear that the ontological excitement of these new concepts is 
contained - book-ended - by deeply ingrained, oppositional stances towards 
developmental psychology and certain notions of pedagogy.  
 
But, if our new materialist work is framed and legitimated by familiar narratives of 
empowerment, emancipation or social justice, how much of a problem is this? There 
may be very good reasons for continuing to use these investments as engines and 
purposes for our research. But we need to acknowledge that this is likely also to 
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reinstall humanist notions of the self, and to invoke the superiority of the critic who 
undertakes to undo error and justice on behalf of subjects, and objects, that do not 
know what is good for them. Recalling that Dionysus is the god of wine, we need to 
ask: is this new wine in old bottles? Or perhaps it’s old wine in new bottles? It’s hard 
to tell. It is not that questions of emancipation and social justice are irrelevant: how 
frivolous would it be to say that? But perhaps it is a matter of learning to ask better 
questions: learning how to tap into the problematic structure of events, so that we can 
learn to be less guided by what we already think we know is important. Once we get 
better at doing that, we will be in a better position to experiment with dosages… 
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